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Compensation covenants for mining activities run with the land: a win for successive 
landowners 
The Queensland Supreme Court case of Cape Flattery Silica Mines Pty Ltd v Hope Vale Aboriginal 
Shire Council [2012] QSC 381 provides guidance on the long-term ramifications of compensation 
agreements for mining activities. The central issue considered by the Court was whether 




Cape Flattery Silica Mines Pty Ltd (the mining company) obtained mining leases over land held by the 
Hope Vale Aboriginal Shire Council (the council) on trust. The parties entered into compensation 
agreements in 1992, as required under the Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld) (Mineral Resources 
Act).1 The compensation agreements contained clauses: 
 for the mining company to make compensation payments to the council based on a gross 
percentage of sales of product from the mine;2 
 for the mining company to maintain the road on the land leading to the mine;3 and 
 for the mining company to provide certain employment and training benefits to indigenous 
members of the community, such as providing two apprenticeships annually and employing 
community members.4 
In 2011, the Deed of Grant in Trust vesting the land in the council was varied to vest the land, 
including land on which the mine was located, in the Hope Vale Congress Aboriginal Corporation (the 
corporation). A dispute arose over whether the council or the corporation was entitled to the 
benefits to be conferred under the compensation agreements. Consequently, the mining company 
applied to the Supreme Court for a declaration as to the construction of the compensation 
agreements.5  
Arguments of the Parties 
The corporation submitted that, as the successor in title to the land on which the mine was 
conducted, it was entitled to receive the compensation payments.6 The council disagreed and 
argued that the rights to compensation were personal to the council and did not run with the land.7 
Submissions were made upon s 281(6) of the Mineral Resources Act, which provides that ‘an amount 
of compensation decided by agreement between the parties...is binding upon the parties and the 
parties’ personal representatives, successors and assigns’. This section was enacted after entry into 
the compensation agreements, and the council argued that it was not relevant as the section did not 
                                                          
1
 Former s 7.36 and current s 279 of the Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld).  
2
 Flattery Silica Mines Pty Ltd v Hope Vale Aboriginal Shire Council [2012] QSC 381 at [3], [24], [25]. 
3
 Ibid [46]. 
4
 Ibid [3], [26]. 
5
 Ibid [7]. 
6
 Ibid [8]. 
7
 Ibid [13]. 
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provide that it was to apply retrospectively.8 The council also contended that the divesting to the 
corporation of a legal interest in the land formerly the subject of an interest held by the council did 
not make the corporation the successor of the council.9  
Finally, the mining company submitted that the corporation was entitled to the compensation 
payments and the council was entitled to the employment benefits under the compensation 
agreements.10 In order to determine the application, Lyons J found it necessary to consider the 
compensation agreements and the relevant legislation in detail.11 The law relating to covenants that 
touch and concern the land was of particular significance. 
Covenants that touch and concern the land 
Firstly, Lyons J noted that a compensation agreement binds the parties and the parties’ successors 
and assigns under s 281(6) of the Mineral Resources Act. Her Honour did not comment on whether 
this section applies retrospectively to agreements entered into before its enactment. Sections 49 
and 53 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) (‘Property Law Act’) were then reviewed. Section 53(1) 
provides that: 
A covenant relating to any land of the covenantee shall be deemed to be made with the covenantee and the 
covenantee’s successors in title and the persons deriving title under the covenantee or the covenantee’s 
successors in title, and shall have effect as if such successors and other persons were expressed.  
This implied covenant was not expressly excluded by the terms of the compensation agreements, as 
contemplated by section 49 of the Property Law Act, and therefore section 53(1) was relevant to the 
agreements. In fact, the agreements were expressly stated to be binding on the parties and their 
respective heirs, assigns and successors, which Lyons J considered significant.12 It was held that the 
corporation was the successor in title to the land on which the mining lease was located.13  
For section 53(1) to apply, covenants must touch and concern the land (‘relate to the land’). Lyons J 
briefly set out common law principles for whether covenants touch and concern the land, including 
the traditional test from P & A Swift Investments:14 
(1) The covenant benefits the covenantee for the time being only, and if separated from the 
land ceases to be of benefit to the covenantee.  
(2) The covenant affects the nature, quality, mode of user or value of the land of the 
covenantee.  
(3) The covenant is not expressed to be personal (that is to say neither being given only to a 
specific covenantee nor in respect of the obligations only of a specific tenant).  
(4) The fact that a covenant is to pay a sum of money will not prevent it from touching and 
concerning the land so long as the three foregoing conditions are satisfied and the covenant 
is connected with something to be done on, to or in relation to the land.  
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 P & A Swift Investments (a firm) v Combined English Stores Group Plc [1989] AC 632 at 642 per Lord Oliver of Aylmerton, 




Without applying any of the four limbs of the test, Lyons J concluded that covenants for payment of 
compensation for the use, destruction or removal of land through mining were ‘obviously’ covenants 
that touch and concern the land.15 Given that compensation payments are a covenant to pay a sum 
of money, it would appear necessary to examine whether these covenants fulfil the first three limbs 
of the test before concluding that they touch and concern the land. This is particularly so considering 
that the classes of covenants that touch and concern the land have traditionally been restricted to 
covenants for matters such as using land for certain purposes, restricting the use of particular 
building materials, restricting the number of structures on the land, or restricting the height of 
buildings to preserve a view.16 Generally, the only types of monetary covenants that will touch and 
concern land are covenants for the payment of rent under a lease or covenants guaranteeing 
payments under a lease.17 This arises from the fact that a leasehold estate is an interest in the land 
and therefore rent ‘issues out of the land and is incident to the reversion’.18 It is doubtful that the 
same conclusion can be reached for payments that are made in relation to activities authorised 
under a mining lease, particularly as it is not an interest in land.19 
These issues were not covered in the judgment. Having concluded that covenants for payment of 
compensation touch and concern the land, Lyons J applied s 53(1) of the Property Law Act with the 
result that the covenants were deemed to be made with the corporation and therefore 
compensation was payable to the corporation.20  
Covenants requiring the mining company to maintain the road leading to the mine were also held to 
touch and concern the land, allowing the corporation to enforce these covenants against the mining 
company.21 The covenants for the provision of employment and training benefits did not touch and 
concern the land and were for the benefit of the council only.22  
General principles can be drawn from this decision as follows: 
(a) Covenants for the payment of compensation for mining activities will touch and concern the 
land and be enforceable by a successive landowner; 
(b) Covenants for maintenance of a road on land covered by a mining lease will touch and 
concern the land and be enforceable by a successive landowner; 
(c) Covenants for the provision of training and employment benefits to members of a 
community located on land where mining activities are undertaken will not touch and 
concern the land and are for the benefit of the original landowner only. 
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Similar decisions will become increasingly prevalent as resource activities expand throughout 
Queensland and interstate, requiring entry into compensation agreements between landowners and 
resource development companies. The enforcement of these agreements by and against third 
parties such as successive landowners is largely untested. Cases such as the one at hand will provide 
valuable guidance. Meanwhile, legal practitioners acting for resource development companies or 
landowners must turn their minds to all of the relevant issues pertaining to compensation 
agreements. Energy and resources legislation, such as the Mineral Resources Act, does not operate 
in a legal vacuum and the execution of compensation agreements may have unforeseen 
consequences under established property law principles.   
This decision also has a wider application for compensation agreements relating to other resource 
authorities. A similar statutory framework applies for compensation agreements relating to 
petroleum leases,23 geothermal leases24 and greenhouse gas storage authorities.25 Notably there 
have been very few geothermal leases and greenhouse gas storage authorities granted in 
Queensland to date.26  
Finally, it must be noted that this decision is subject to appeal in accordance with the relevant 
statutory timeframe.27 
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